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OF BALKANIZED EMPIRES AND COOPERATIVE
ALLIES: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY ON
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS*
Douglas W. Kmiec**
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787
brought two experiences with them: a substantial dislike for the tyrannical
behavior of an English King and a profound disappointment with the weak-
nesses of the Articles of Confederation. They knew well, from their study of
Locke and Montesquieu, that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands .... may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny."' Yet, the framers' most recent experience,
under the Articles of Confederation, had replaced the tyranny of the King
with an ineffectual central legislature largely subservient to state legislative
bodies. Royal supremacy had given way to "the supremacy of faction and
the tyranny of shifting majorities."2
Out of the twofold desire to avoid tyranny, in whatever form, and to re-
tain a workable government, arose the dynamic of separated powers in con-
junction with clearly stated checks and balances. The first three Articles of
the Constitution assign primary, but not unrestrained, authority for the leg-
islative, executive, and judicial functions to the two Houses of Congress,3 the
President,4 and the Supreme Court,5 respectively. These functions are not
neatly separated or "hermetically sealed." Congress passes open-textured
statutes which invariably invite both the President and the courts to fill in
the gaps, and thus, make law. Similarly, members of Congress and the Pres-
* Brendan Brown Lecture, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law, September 17, 1987. Professor Kmiec also extends his appreciation to the Board of
Foreign Scholarships which permitted him to present earlier versions of these thoughts as a
Fulbright Distinguished Scholar in Hong Kong and Malaysia.
** Professor of Law and Director, Thos. J. White Center on Law & Government, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S.
Department of Justice, 1985-1987.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961).
2. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 375 (1976).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I.
4. Id. art. II.
5. Id. art. III.
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ident are regularly called upon to determine issues of constitutionality, and
thus, interpret law.
That the functions of government do indeed overlap suggests the futility
of rigid theoretical insistence upon a precise separation of power. It also
reveals the justification for the framers' reliance upon procedural checks and
balances, rather than substantive and inflexible definitions of authority, to
preserve their tripartite structure. These checks and balances are well-
known. They include the President's ability to veto legislation6 and Con-
gress' countervailing authority to override that disapproval with the concur-
rence of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress.7 The judiciary is checked
by Congress' ability to determine the kind of cases which may be brought to
court,8 and even, with the exception of the Supreme Court, to eliminate the
federal courts.9 Judicial authority is also bounded by the practical willing-
ness of the executive to enforce judicial decisions. In turn, the courts have
the final word with respect to the propriety and constitutionality of both
executive decisions and legislation.
Over the long term, these procedural checks and balances have been es-
sential safeguards against improvidently passed laws, the obduracy of the
executive, and even the inclination of the judiciary, the so-called "least dan-
gerous branch," to go beyond its assigned function of adjudicating cases and
controversies. With respect to the judicial branch, it is popular today to
level criticism at the courts for the usurpation of the lawmaking function.
Some of this criticism is justified, some not. I do not intend to enter the
debate, for in my judgment most judges conscientiously aspire to ascertain
6. The Constitution of the United States provides:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If
he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to the
House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on
their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
7. The Constitution of the United States provides: "[I1f after such Reconsideration two
thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent together with the Objections, to
the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of
that House, it shall become a Law." Id.
8. The Constitution of the United States provides:
In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In
all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdic-
tion, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.
Id. art. 11I, § 2, cl. 2.
9. The Constitution of the United States provides: "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." Id. art. III, § 1.
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the will of the legislature and not to impose their own. Significantly, on two
occasions within the last five years'0 the Supreme Court has properly re-
jected claims that the modern day realities of government necessitate depar-
ture from what the Court has described as a "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedure"" set out by the framers. Constitutional
structure and procedure did not give way to expediency, and this, in itself, is
a tribute to the Court's ability to say what the law is.
Yet, as important as the safeguards of divided power and its judicial ac-
knowledgment have been, they are often eclipsed by the day-to-day tension
yielded by the less definable essence of the separation of powers among the
three branches. As will be discussed, this tension is greatest between the
executive and the legislature.12
Before getting to actual disputes, however, it is worthwhile to spend a
moment on this bicentennial of the Constitution to reflect upon whether the
tension borne of the separation of powers serves us well or ill. In my judg-
ment, the consequences of this imprecise concept must be viewed favorably.
The tyranny, suffering, and loss of liberty associated with centralized power
has not been a feature in the American political landscape. Moreover, the
concept has been a necessary operational adjunct to a constitutional scheme
premised on express grants of limited national power, and a reservation of
authority to the states and the people themselves. To be sure, the interests
and activities of the national government have expanded well beyond the
conceptions of the framers, and arguably, beyond the express terms of the
constitutional document itself. Nevertheless, these expansions into local
decisionmaking would surely be greater if national authority were central-
ized in a single hand. At the very least, with national power divided, the
sovereign states have multiple forums in which to seek redress from particu-
lar encroachments upon their interests and in which to find an amenable
advocate for federalism.
Related to this point is the greater responsiveness of the government to the
citizenry which results from separated powers. Ours is a nation of pluralism
and, within that pluralism, deeply felt views. No one authority could possi-
bly accommodate them all, and thus, bitter conflict is avoided by the very
fact that no one authority can impose a singular resolution. That such con-
flict can and does result from the assertion of concentrated authority is am-
ply demonstrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 3 where
10. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
11. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
12. See infra notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the court articulated a federal constitutional right to an abortion, contrary to
the then-existing laws of most states and contrary to the current views of the
President and a significant number of members of Congress. Because the
powers of government are separated, however, those in opposition to the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe have had their interests responded to by a
congressional restriction on the use of federal money for abortions 4 and the
President's recent announcement of executive rulemaking to carry out Con-
gress' legislative mandate for a separation between preventive family plan-
ning programs, which may be federally funded, and abortion-related
services, which may not.' 5
Separation of powers also produces greater deliberation and specializa-
tion. A deliberative process which is subject to the scrutiny of competing
powers is more likely to yield a course based upon consensus. It is also not
unfair to say that legislators inhabiting the more heady regions of theory and
policy are not usually the best administrators.
These benefits of the separation of powers, of course, do not come without
cost. Subjectively, those who want the public sector to do more, not less, or
those who are chary of the parochial views of the states are not likely to be
pleased by the limitations of divided authority at the national level. So too,
prolonged deliberation in search of consensus can mask inefficiency, and spe-
cialization may simply spawn labyrinthine bureaucracies.
The greatest cost, or if you will, danger to separated powers, however, lies
in the occasionally extreme adversarial attitude it can produce.' 6 Certainly,
each branch must be wary of encroachment upon its authority, but surely
not at the cost of losing sight of the common purposes of the Republic stated
eloquently in the Constitution's preamble.' 7 Nor should the general popu-
lace be misled into believing that every arguable encroachment triggers a
constitutional crisis meriting gavel to gavel television coverage or the ap-
pointment of an independent counsel. The boundaries of power are far too
imprecise to have them litigated like constitutional trespass actions.
An overly adversarial attitude, which insists upon a precise demarcation
14. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1982).
15. 52 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59) (proposed September 1,
1987).
16. To some degree, this attitude is instinctive in government officials insofar as they natu-
rally seek to expand their territorial authority. Such aggressiveness is further driven by the
large number of lawyers in American government, who afterall, are taught not to accommo-
date, but to zealously advocate the interests of their client.
17. The framers' common purposes for forming a republican form of government were
"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity." U.S. CONST. preamble.
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of powers in matters of every significance, thrives on a level of confrontation
which neither is in keeping with the intent of the framers nor is necessarily
conducive to good government. As former Attorney General and Professor
of Law Edward Levi remarked, "[t]he branches of government were not
designed to be at war with one another. The relationship was not to be an
adversary one .... ," Similarly, the late Justice Robert Jackson observed
that "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it
also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interde-
pendence, autonomy but reciprocity."' 9
As history and even current events demonstrate, members of any branch
of government forget this lesson at their peril. President Truman forgot it
when he seized steel plants without legislative authorization or inherent con-
stitutional authority.2" President Nixon did the same when he impounded
or refused to spend funds authorized to be spent by Congress.2 Congress
overstepped its constitutional boundary when it sought to empower a largely
legislative commission to enforce election laws through litigation,22 and
when it retained authority over the implementation of previously passed
laws by means of the legislative veto.23 In each case, there was a direct
corrective reaction by the branch encroached upon or an indirect correction
through the courts. In a sense, these corrections give proof to the genius of
the framers' creation for thwarting even petty tyrannies. However, each oc-
casion for correction does its own damage, just as something repaired never
quite equals the vitality it had when new. Furthermore, in these corrections
lie the seeds of greater hostility and suspicion. If historian Arthur Schles-
inger is correct to suggest that modern Presidents have bordered on the im-
perial in undertaking military activity without a congressional declaration of
war,24 what is the proper characterization of the congressional response in
the War Powers Act 25 or other statutory limitations on the President's con-
stitutionally assigned role as Commander in Chief? 26
18. Levi, supra note 2, at 391.
19. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
20. See id. at 582-89.
21. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 45-48 (1975) (Federal Water Pollution
Control Act did not provide the President with discretion to withhold funds from allotment
and obligation).
22. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137-43 (1976).
23. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983).
24. See generally A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973) (discussing mili-
tary action within the President's role as Commander in Chief).
25. War Powers Resolution §§ 1-9, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982).
26. The Constitution of the United States provides: "The President shall be Commander
1987]
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Action, reaction, counteraction-the process is inexorable and self-de-
structive. While undesirable, it is hardly an unnatural response for the exec-
utive branch to enshroud its foreign affairs in even greater secrecy-a
secrecy that has apparently frustrated even chief executive review of foreign
policy and a secrecy that is likely to invite unworkable proposals for a rigid
compartmentalization of functions. Thus, failure to understand that the
framers envisaged the separated branches of government not as balkanized
empires but as cooperative allies designed to "achieve a harmony of purposes
differently fulfilled"27 leads to a divorce, rather than a separation of powers,
and, in that, its own undoing.
The actual interplay of the separation of powers is colored by the institu-
tional features of the branches and the personalities of those who inhabit
them. I will leave the dissection of personalities to the biographers, but cer-
tain patterns are easily discerned. Lincoln's strong presidency was aided and
abetted by the exigencies of the Civil War and the coincidence of single party
domination of both the White House and Congress. The post-Civil War era
returned power to the legislative branch until Theodore Roosevelt trans-
formed the presidency into his "bully pulpit."28 A period of equilibrium
followed World War I until the economic emergency of the depression and
the demands of World War II led to the domination of events by Franklin
Roosevelt. With some exception, the executive maintained its preeminence
until the Vietnam War reawakened congressional initiative. Congress en-
larged its staff, undertook greater scrutiny of foreign policy, and internally
reconstituted the budget process.
Watergate further weakened the presidency, and not just for President
Nixon. As former Solicitor General Rex Lee commented, "Watergate had
left its legacy, and part of that legacy was a diminution in the ability of the
executive branch to withstand intrusions by Congress into an area that
should have belonged to the executive: protection of official governmental
secrets."29 The Carter years saw continued congressional control, although
excessive government spending, high unemployment, and a dramatic in-
crease in inflation created public skepticism towards the legislative process
as well.
President Reagan benefited from the public's disaffection with "legislative
politics as usual" and also from a confluence of economic policies which
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
27. Levi, supra note 2, at 391.
28. J. CONLIN, THE MORROW BOOK OF QUOTATIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 253
(1984).
29. R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 49 (1981).
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have led to lower tax rates and inflation, as well as economic expansion and
new employment. The President's well-articulated strengthening of defense
policies also seemed to bolster public confidence, although legitimate doubts
linger in the shadow of an ever-larger national debt and a highly volatile
stock market. Seemingly, the Iran-Contra matter disclosed in late 1986 once
again recalibrated the executive/legislative balance. However, we may still
be too close to these events to tell their actual effect. Somewhat unexpect-
edly, the inundation of televised committee proceedings, patently designed to
crudely divide the good and able men from the evildoers, may have actually
resulted in a greater public sophistication about the uneasy separation of
powers in our constitutional Republic.
It is interesting to note the sharp differences between the Iranian inquiry
and Watergate as it relates to congressional access to executive information.
As a general matter, Congress was given virtually everything within the con-
trol of the executive branch that it had requested. In terms of a full account-
ing of the facts, this is surely salutary. Yet, the executive must necessarily
have concerns, some of which are anchored in the separation of powers, lest
this expedient response, dictated in part by the memories of Watergate, lead
to the mishandling of classified information or perhaps damage specific and
only tangentially related foreign policy efforts.
Some contemporary examples of conflict between the executive and legis-
lative branches may further elucidate the separation of powers. For exam-
ple, it is unassailable that Congress may undertake to investigate how well
the executive is enforcing the law. Congress' authority is at its strongest
when such oversight is directly in aid of its lawmaking function: to deter-
mine whether existing law needs revision or whether additional legislation is
required. In contrast, as Congress' interest moves away from lawmaking
and toward mere supervision of executive personnel, a task committed by
the Constitution to the President, 30 the separation of powers would argue for
congressional restraint.
This has not always been the case, however, and such disputes often be-
come manifest when the executive refuses to supply information to Congress
under a claim of executive privilege. While executive privilege retains its
negative connotation from the Watergate episode, it is important to remem-
ber that the Court in United States v. Nixon,31 although unanimously requir-
ing President Nixon to give up his tapes, clearly acknowledged that the
privilege is "inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Con-
30. The Constitution of the United States provides: "The executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. I.
31. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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stitution. ' '32 Like the nuances of the separation of powers, however, the
privilege is qualified, and in Nixon it had to yield to a specific need for evi-
dence in a criminal trial. 33 Thus, any claim of privilege balances the execu-
tive's need to protect information against Congress' or the Court's need to
know that information as those needs are defined in relation to the powers
assigned by the Constitution. Just as Congress' oversight role is most com-
pelling in aid of its direct legislative function, so too, the executive's claim of
privilege is greatest when it is premised upon the specific need to protect
military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security information.
Another executive/legislative intersection occurred over the use of the so-
called legislative veto. For almost sixty years in a great variety of legislative
enactments, Congress had included provisions which authorized the execu-
tive to issue implementing regulations, but subject to the approval, or lack of
disapproval, by one or both Houses of Congress or a committee. As a prac-
tical matter, the legislative veto was a device designed to usurp executive
enforcement authority. For example, under the immigration laws, the exec-
utive was given the authority to determine matters of deportation.3 4 In
1974, when the Attorney General exercised that authority in a manner dis-
pleasing to the House of Representatives, the House passed a resolution re-
versing his decision.35 Believing this resolution not to be new legislation, but
rather merely oversight of existing law, the House did not present the resolu-
tion to the President. 6 -
These were the facts which led the Supreme Court to find the legislative
veto to be unconstitutional in Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Chadha. 3 7 Writing for the Court, former Chief Justice Burger defined legis-
lative action broadly to include all actions with the "purpose and effect of
altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including [executive
branch officials] . . . outside the legislative branch."3" Thus, the legislative
veto's interference with the powers of the executive was twofold in Chadha:
first, the legislative reversal of the Attorney General's decision,39 and, sec-
ond, the failure of Congress to comply with the presentment clause of the
Constitution 4' by presenting the legislation containing that same reversal to
32. Id. at 708.
33. Id. at 711-12.
34. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).
35. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 926 (1983).
36. Id. at 927-28.
37. Id. at 919.
38. Id. at 952.
39. Id.
40. The Constitution of the United States provides: "[E]very Bill which shall have passed
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the President for his consideration. 4 In addition, the legislative veto was
not only an encroachment upon executive authority, but also a disregard for
legislative procedure insofar as it violated the bicameral requirements of the
Constitution42 by which both houses of Congress must pass a bill before it
can become law.43
Conflict also results between the executive and legislative branches when
the executive declines to enforce what it believes to be an unconstitutional
statute. Former Attorney General William French Smith has pressed this
point in two contexts: first, where the law at issue encroaches upon execu-
tive authority and, second, where clear precedent suggests the invalidity of
the law. One may wonder why a President would sign legislation he thought
was unconstitutional. The reason becomes apparent once the modern con-
gressional practice of inserting substantive legislation in appropriations
measures is understood. In effect, the President is given a choice between
approving constitutionally suspect legislation buried in an appropriation or
vetoing the measure and shutting the government down. The problem is
further aggravated by the legislative practice of passing funding measures in
the waning hours of a fiscal year, and sometimes even later. Since 1980, the
government has, in fact, been shut down several times for lack of funds. The
separation of powers are surely implicated by a practice that effectively ne-
gates the President's veto authority.
Because of the increasing impracticality of a veto, presidents have placed
renewed emphasis upon presidential signing statements to articulate their
constitutional concerns." Such statements have a long history, but they are
now more readily employed to direct subordinate executive officers to inter-
pret newly enacted laws in rather specific ways to avoid unconstitutional
implementation. In a sense, such statements are analogous to the executive
stating directions in rulemaking or adopting a statutory interpretation in liti-
gation. Nevertheless, members of Congress and other commentators, suspi-
cious that the President will deliberately misinterpret the law to suit
executive purposes, have objected to such statements as a usurpation of the
legislative function. For example, the counsel to the House of Representa-
tives argues that once a bill is on the President's desk "his role is limited to
the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to
the President of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
41. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946.
42. The Constitution of the United States provides: "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
43. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945-46.
44. Kmiec, Judges Should Pay Attention to Statements By President, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 10,
1986, at 13.
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thumbs up or thumbs down, with no shades of gray [in between]." 4 5 How-
ever, an appreciation of the separation of powers demonstrates the inflexibil-
ity of such a broadly stated objection. The President has the executive
responsibility to "take care that the [l]aws be faithfully executed."'46 This in
itself commands a faithful and reasonable effort to make sure subordinates
understand the law and enforce it. By the same token, any attempt by a
President to supply additional terms or adopt an interpretation that would
do violence to the terms provided by the Legislature would be unwarranted
and antagonistic to legislative powers.
The President used a signing statement to highlight the separation of pow-
ers difficulty in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, 4 7 more commonly known as Gramm-Rudman. The Act specified de-
clining deficit targets for each fiscal year through 1991.48 In any year in
which the deficit target was expected to be exceeded, the Comptroller Gen-
eral, a legislative officer removable only by Congress, was authorized to spec-
ify spending cuts to be made and to direct the President to make them,
unless Congress legislated other reductions which obviated the need for the
cuts.4 9 In signing the law, the President stated: "I am mindful of the serious
constitutional questions raised .... The bill assigns a significant role to [a
legislative officer] .... Under the system of separated powers established by
the Constitution, however, executive functions may only be performed by
officers in the executive branch."5
The President was quite right to raise the objection since a few months
later in Bowsher v. Synar5" the Supreme Court invalidated the law on pre-
cisely the basis stated by the President. According to the court:
To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws
would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress
could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for execut-
ing the laws in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Congress.
This kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws
... is constitutionally impermissible.5 2
45. Greenhouse, Washington Talk: The White House; Signing Bills, Reagan Tries to
Write History, The N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at B14, col. 3 (quoting Steven R. Ross, Counsel
to the House of Representatives).
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
47. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 31 and 42
U.S.C.) (Supp. III 1985)).
48. Id. (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 622 (Supp. III 1985)).
49. Id. (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. III 1985)).
50. President .Reagan's Statement on Signing H.J. Res. 372 Into Law, 21 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1491 (Dec. 12, 1985).
51. 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3194 (1986).
52. Id. at 3189.
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The Court's decision in Bowsher invalidating the balanced budget legisla-
tion on separation of powers grounds raises the question of what role the
judiciary should play constitutionally in settling disputes between the execu-
tive and legislative branches. Because of the fluid nature of the concept,
such disputes are, as a practical matter, often best left to the political arena.
Indeed, the Court's political question doctrine, though never clearly applied
in a separation of powers case, seems appropros. That doctrine asks whether
the dispute has been committed by the Constitution to a branch other than
the court, whether the lack of definable judicial standards precludes judicial
action, and whether the controversial nature of the dispute counsels pruden-
tial noninvolvement.53
These questions are not easily answered, however, because several
Supreme Court decisions have shunted the political question doctrine aside
in order to reach questions that were previously thought committed else-
where under the Constitution: namely, legislative apportionment 54 and the
seating of a member of Congress whose qualifications were in doubt.55
Moreover, noted scholar Herbert Wechsler has severely criticized the polit-
ical question doctrine as antagonistic to the Court's primary function, which
is, in the words of John Marshall, "to say what the law is.",5 6 It should be
noted, though, that Wechsler's criticism merely suggests that the Court
should take the case in order to determine whether, in fact, the dispute has
been constitutionally committed elsewhere.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has spoken strongly in favor of the political ques-
tion doctrine.57 Similarly, Professor Choper has urged that the Court
should generally abstain where the political branches can fend for them-
selves.5 8 In large part, this idea is also implicit in Justice White's dissent in
the Gramm-Rudman case, which suggests that where a statute poses "no
real danger of aggrandizement of congressional power" the Court should not
interfere.59 According to Justice White, "[t]he role of [the] Court should be
limited to determining whether the Act so alters the balance of authority
among the branches of government as to pose a genuine threat to the basic
53. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962).
54. Id. at 209.
55. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-22 (1969).
56. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
57. See, e.g., Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 468 U.S. 1310, 1312 (1984); Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001, 1005-06 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 783-84 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS passim
(1980).
59. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3211-14 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
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division between the lawmaking power and the power to execute the law.""'
That cautionary note is appropriate. Nevertheless, it should not be taken
to signify a tolerance for the blurring of power in a manner contrary to the
structural features of the Constitution. In my judgment, the Court's deci-
sions in Chadha and Bowsher were necessary reaffirmations of the principles
which maintain the constitutional allocation of authority among coequal
branches which we revere today. Having done that, the Court may, and
perhaps should, prudentially refrain from resolving day-to-day interbranch
disputes. Those entrusted with governmental power forget, at their peril and
ours, that the first line of duty in fulfilling the terms of the Constitution rests
with them, not with the courts. Each branch must strive to observe its func-
tional limitations. Most importantly, when encroachments of power occur,
the affected branch must seek rectification in a manner which does not para-
lyze the governmental process. To do otherwise would lose sight of the fact
that the framers sought not only the preservation of liberty, but liberty's
preservation within the confines of a workable government.
60. Id. at 3214-15 (White, J., dissenting).
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